The evaluation of availability in resistant to differential and linear cryptanalytic attacks is essential in designing secure block ciphers. In this paper, we present evaluated results of security estimation for SPECTR-128 block cipher. The results show that SPECTR'-128 (modified version of SPECTR-128) is a highly-resistant to differential and linear cryptanalytic attacks.
Introduction
SPECTR-128 is a block cipher proposed by Moldovyan N.A in [1] . The specification of SPECTR-128 can be found in [1] . An overview of its architecture is given in Fig. 1 .
This cipher is based on extensive use of CP-box operations. The left data subblock is used to specify the permutations on the right data subblock and roundsubkey. The use of two mutually inverse DDP performed sequentially on the right subblock allows one to perform enciphering and deciphering with the same algorithm. A single-layer CP-box is used to quickly change the key schedule while changing encryption mode for decryption one. A peculiarity of SPECTR-128 is the use of the data-dependent transformation of round subkeys (so called internal key scheduling [2] -IKE). It is based on a combination of DDP and special fast operation G [3, 4] in order to greatly reduce the effectiveness of differential and linear cryptanalysis.
This paper provides the results of a cryptographic evaluation of SPECTR-128 (SPECTR'-128).
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly present 128-bit cipher SPECTR-128. Sections 3 and 4 present differential and linear cryptanalytic attacks of SPECTR-128, respectively. Finally, we conclude in Section 5.
Description of SPECTR-128
SPECTR-128 is a new 12-round block cipher with 128-bit input. The general encryption scheme is defined by the following formulas: C = Encr(M, K) and M = Decr(C, K), where M is the plaintext, C is the cipher text Encr is the encryption function, and Decr is the decryption function. In the block cipher SPECTR-128 encryption and decryption functions are described by formula ( ) is the extended key (EK), the last being a function of the secret key 1 4 (
and of the transformation mode parameter e (e = 0 defines encryption, e = 1 defines decryption). We have X = M, for e = 0 and X = C for e = 1. EK is represented as concatenation of 14 subkeys: 
Figure1. General structure of SPECTR-128
The structure of the procedure Crypt is shown in Figure 2 .
(1)
Figure2.Structure of the procedure Crypt
This procedure has the form:
, A
, A (3) and A (4) ) where R, L, A (1) , A (2) , A (3) , A (4) ∈{0,1}
64 . Thus, Crypt transforms the data subblock R under Final transformation
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control of the data subblock L and 256-bit extendedsubkey. This procedure uses the following operations: to-left cyclic rotation "<<<" by fixed number of bits, XOR operation "⊕", non-linear operation G, DDP operations P 64/192 and P Differential properties of the CP boxes with the given structure are defined by properties of the elementary switching element. Using the main properties of the last (see Figure 3) it is easy to find characteristics of the P 64/192 -box. Table 1 presents probabilities of different output differences corresponding to differences Table1.Values of probability 64 192 ( )
1.52⋅2 Avalanche effect corresponding to the operations G is defined by its structure that provides each input bit influences several (u) output bits (except the 64th input bit influences only the 64th output bit). Table 2 presents the formulas describing avalanche caused by inverting the bit l i . Let Δl i denote alteration of l i . We shall consider the case when the data and key are uniformly distributed random values. One can see that l i , where 7 ≤ i ≤ 55, causes deterministic alteration of the output bit y i and probabilistic alteration of the output bits y i+1 , y i+3 , y i+6 ,…, y i+9 which change with probability p = 0.5 (for 1 ≤ i ≤ 6 we have deterministic alteration of y i and y i+3 , since Δy i+3 =Δl i l i-6 ). When passing through the operation G the difference
Δ can be transformed with certain probability to the output differences 1 Tables 3 and 4) . 
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Table3.Values of the probability 1 ( ) 
Differential analysis
Our best variant of the differential cryptanalysis (DCA) [5, 6] of SPECTR-128 corresponds to two-round characteristic with difference 0 1 ( ).
This difference passes two rounds in the following way (see Figure 5 ). It is easy to see that this difference passes the first round with probability 1 and after swapping subblocks it transforms to 1 0 
One can denote Case 1 as set of the following events:
Using such form of representation one can describe the following two cases:
Case 2: are calculated in the similar way using the structure of the box P 64/192 and distribution of the controlling bits over elementary switching boxes P 2/1 (this distribution is defined by Table A-2 The last value takes into account that the 109th and 133d boxes P 2/1 do not generate non-zero output difference and the 182nd one generates two active bits. Taking into account the symmetric structure of the round transformation and symmetry of the boxes P 64/192 and P -1 64/192 it is easy to see that P′′′ = P′, where P′ and P′′′ are the contributions to the probability of the two-round differential characteristic corresponding to the first and third cases. Thus, it is sufficient to calculate P′ and the contribution P′′ of the second case. Due to different rotations before extension boxes corresponding to CP-box operations P′ and P′′ we have P′′′≠P′.
Probability P′ can be calculated using the following formula: 
. Due to symmetry of the boxes P′ and P * there are possible contributing events (analogous to Cases 1 -3) including generation of the additional pair of active bits in P′ and annihilation of these bits in P * . The contribution of such events is P 0 ≈ 1.1⋅2 -21 . For probability of the two-round characteristic we have P(2)≈P′+P′′+P′′′+P 0 ≈1.4.2 -19 .
Modified version SPECTR'-128
Differential analysis has shown that the structure of the extension box (i.e. the table describing distribution of the bits of the left data subblock over elementary switching elements of the CP boxes) is a critical part of SPECTR-128. It is easy to see that small change in the extension box leads to significant decrease or increase of the probability of two-round characteristic. Indeed, we can reduce the probability P(2) by factor ≈2 8 using the extension box described by the Table 5 . Let call the modified version SPECTR'-128. For SPECTR'-128 cases 1, 2, and 3 give zero contribution to the probability of two-round characteristic. After modification of E-box the most contributing cases are the following (∀i,t,ki,t∈{1,2,...,64}, k∈{1, 3,6,7,8,9}, t≠i,andt≠i+k) .
Case 5b
Calculating the total contribution of the cases 4a, 4b, 5a, 5b, 6a, and 6b we have obtained P(2)=1.85⋅2 -28
≈2
-27 . Thus, after modification of the extension box the value P(2) has been significantly reduced. Now the three-round characteristic becomes the most efficient one. One of possible mechanisms of the formation of this characteristic is shown in Fig. 5 . This characteristic does not depend on small modifications of the distribution table. In the most contributing mechanisms of the formation of the three-round characteristic in second and third rounds the operation G produces output difference exactly with one active bit.
To calculate probability 2
one should take into account its dependence on i. Let ( ) 2 i p be the probability that the output difference of G has exactly one active bit corresponding to theith digit. Probability ( ) 2 i p is equal to 2 -6 for i∈{7,...,55}, 2 -5 for i = 56, 2 -4 fori = 56, 2 -3 for i = 58, 2 -2 for i∈{59,60,61}, 2 -1 for i∈{62,63}, 1 for i = 64, and 0 for i∈{1,...,6}. For uniformly distributed random value i we have the average value p 2 ≈0.93⋅2 -4 while considering the operation G as individual unit. Probability that in the second round the P′′-box generates no pairs of active bits is p (i)
=2
-3 for all i. The same probability corresponds to the individual boxes P' and P * , however, because of their mutual symmetry one has to consider these two boxes as a single unit. Probability that they generate no pair of active bits at the output of the operation P * is ( 
− ∑
In the third round the active bit passing the box P' is XORed with the single output active bit of the operation G with probability p′′=2 -6 and no new active bits are formed by operations G, P', P", and P * with probability p′≈1.14⋅2 -13 . Thus, for probability of the three-round characteristic we get P(3)=p′ 2 p′′≈1.3⋅2
-32 .
Contribution of the two-round characteristic to the value (12)
P is P (2) (12) = P 6 (2) ≈ (2 -27 ) 6 = 2 -162 . Contribution of the three-round characteristic is P (3) (12) = P 
Linear Cryptanalysis
Comparison of the known results on security estimation of the DDP-based ciphers shows that linear cryptanalysis (LCA) [7, 8] appears to be less efficient to attack DDP-based ciphers as compared with DCA. For example, to thwart the linear attack against SPECTR-H64 (DDP-64) seven [9] (three [10] ) rounds are sufficient whereas to thwart the differential attack on that cipher at least ten [11] (eight [10] ) rounds are required. Fixed permutations and the DDP operations are bijections that preserve the Hamming weight of the input vector, however to use this property in a linear attack one should apply masks having maximum weight. Such 
masks are note efficient due to non-linear operations used together with DDP. Detailed theory of the linear characteristics (LC) of the CP-boxes is presented in [9] . Let denote an input mask as M and the output mask as B. In that paper it has been shown that: 
The last value is calculated as follows (see fig.7 ). Note that for considered particular case of keys the P * -box moves the left most input bit to the left most digit at the output, if the P'-box moves the left most input bit to the left mostdigit at its output. Bias of the considered one-round LC is
If the P'-box moves the left umost input bit to the left umost digit at its output we have 0 0 1 1
wherez 1 is the first bit of the vector Z at the output of the CP box P'. Probability of this event is 1/n = 2 −6 . Probability that
). If the P'-box moves any other input bit to the left umost digit at its output then we have 
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Figure7.Formation of the one-round linear
The bias gets maximum value for the cases ϕ(A
) = 1 and ϕ(A In order to eliminate linear attacks based on the considered LC we propose to use in the modified version SPECTR'-128 the constant C = (101010…10) instead of thesubkeyA (3) (earliersuch mechanism was used in DDP-64 [14] ). Since in this case we have t = ϕ(C) = n/2, the bias of the considered characteristic equals to zero, therefore an attacker should add at least one active bit in used masks and this will reduce sharply the bias value due to both the variable permutations and the G operation.
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5 Conclusion
Security of the 128-bit block cipher SPECTR-128 is based on the use of DDP performed with P 64/192 -boxes, specially designed extension boxes, and the nonlinear operation G.
Some remarks should be given about IKS. Actually it is a part of the round data transformation only. It introduces no delay, since it is executed in parallel with some data ciphering operations. Notion IKS corresponds to the part of encryption procedure related to the data-dependent transformation ofsubkey (orsubkeys) executed in parallel with the transformation of data. The internal key scheduling used in SPECTR-128 is not complex, but it changes from one data block to another, making the avalanche effect faster and crypto scheme significantly more secure against differential and linear cryptanalysis.
In one round of SPECTR-128 the left data subblock is kept constant, however this data subblock participates in round transformation influencing transformation of the right data subblock. Our DCA of SPECTR-128 has shown that the structure of the extension boxes is a critical part of the DDP-based ciphers. Presenting the modified version SPECTR'-128 we have shown the small modifications in the table describing the extension box significantly change the probability of the differential characteristics. Our preliminary LCA shows that SPECTR-128 secure against linear attacks, although much more work on LCA of this cipher is to be done. Because of the use very simple key scheduling there are possible weak keys having the structure K = (K 1 , K 2 , K 3 , K 4 ) = (X, X, Y, Y), their portion (2 -128 ) is negligible though. An interesting way to avoid weak keys is the use of the switchable (e-dependent) operations, one can use some complex key scheduling though (weak we call the keys for which encryption function is involution).
The aim of the description and discussion of the SPECTR ciphers is to illustrate the design of the DDP-based ciphers and to show that such ciphers represent a suitable model for calculation of the differential characteristics and security estimations. We estimate that introducing small changes if the structure of the operation G one can easy reduce the probability of the three-round differential characteristic and design secure ten-round or eight-round SPECTR-like cryptosystem. For example it is easy to compose a G-like function G′ for which two output bits change deterministically when an input bit flips. Use of the operation G′ in SPECTR reduces drastically the probability of the two-round and three-round differential characteristics as well as the bias of linear characteristics. Detailed design of the SPECTR-like cryptosystem with reduced number of rounds appears to be a subject of separate consideration.
